If Francis is a Modernist then, might the Conservative Weinandy possibly hold Semi-Modernist and Semi-Arian Opinions?

"Some... assembled [Council] prelates advocated... harsh measures towards the [Semi-Arian] Arianizers... Athanasius, however, proposed more temperate measures... A decree was passed, that such bishops as had communicated with the Arians through weakness or surprise, should be recognized in their respective sees, on signing the Nicene formulary; but that those, who publicly defended the heresy, should only be admitted to lay-communion... Yet it cannot be denied, that men of zeal and boldness were found among the [Semi-Arian] Arianizers. Two laymen, Flavian and Diodorus, protested with spirit against the [unambiguous Arian] heterodoxy of the crafty Leontius, and kept alive an orthodox [Catholic] party in the midst of the [Arian] Eusebian communion." (The Arians of the Fourth Century, By John Henry Newman, Pages 198-199)

Francis's closest adviser and collaborator Cardinal Oscar Rodriguez Maradiaga apparently declared himself, Francis and all liberals to be total Modernist heretics since Vatican II:

"The Second Vatican Council... meant an end to the hostilities between the Church and Modernism... Modernism was, most of the time, a reaction against injustices and abuses that disparaged the dignity and rights of the person."
(Whispers in the Loggia Website, "The Council's  'Unfinished Business,' The Church's 'Return to Jesus"... and Dreams of "The Next Pope" - A Southern Weekend with Francis' 'Discovery Channel,'" October 28, 2013)

The homosexual journalist conservative Catholic Milo Yiannopoulos in his book "Diabolical" reported:

"Since Vatican II, most popes have been preoccupied with holding together the conservative [Semi-Modernist] and liberal [Modernist heretic] factions that emerged in its wake."

During the Arian crisis, Semi-Arians were those who attempted the practically almost impossible task of being loyal to the traditional teachings of the Church while holding on to Semi-Arian ambiguous teachings because they were afraid of being in schism with the total Arian heretics.

So today, it appears that most conservative Catholics like the Semi-Arians have tried to do the practically almost impossible task of being loyal to the infallible teachings of the Church while holding on to Semi-Modernist ambiguous teachings as well as the ambiguities of Vatican II because they are afraid of being in schism with the Modernist heretics.

Might it be because like in the Arian crisis when there were Arians and Semi-Arians so today there are Semi-Modernists who because of "weakness" don't want schism and want communion with the total Modernist heretics?

If Francis is a Modernist then, might the conservative Fr. Thomas Weinandy possibly hold Semi-Modernist and Semi-Arian opinions?

This Project MUSE theological article seems to present the case that Weinandy might possibly hold Semi-Arian poistions: 

This article responds to Thomas Weinandy's account of the consciousness and knowledge of Christ. Deserving of careful consideration, his is a rich and multifaceted proposal on a difficult and complex topic. Some of the complexity is theological in nature, not all of which I will be able to avoid in my response. Still, this response is meant to be primarily philosophical in nature. And it appears that there are two kinds of philosophical presuppositions that typically go unacknowledged in discussions of this topic. One concerns theories of personhood and self-consciousness. The other has to do with the "principle of perfection," a "principle of fittingness"—or what Thomas Weinandy calls "the false presupposition" of Thomas Aquinas's Christology. To my mind, both are philosophical presuppositions, but the first (on personhood and self-consciousness) fits the theme of this volume more closely, and so it will be the topic of this response.

Person versus I—The Trinity

Weinandy's proposal regarding the human consciousness of Christ seems peculiar if not unique in that it suggests that in Christ there is no divine I, but only a human I. In fact, in this proposal none of the divine persons has an I—though I am not sure the suggestion is that they share a common [End Page 425] I.² Thus Christ would be a divine person without a divine I. The personal pronoun I would be connected with a human nature as self-conscious, rather than with the divine person in which this nature subsists.

While it might seem strange to disconnect personal pronouns from the persons to whom they refer, I think we can indeed make sense of this distinction, if we identify being an I with being self-conscious. Being self-conscious is that which is left from being an I, if we subtract personhood from the I—if we subtract from it the who in which the property of self-consciousness subsists. We may indeed have philosophical or ethical reasons to make such a distinction between persons and their self-consciousness in the case of embryos and persons in a permanent vegetative state, who presumably are persons, though they are not self-conscious and cannot say, "I," to themselves.³

In the case of divine persons, of course, we would wonder whether this distinction can be more than conceptual. Divine persons do not develop from an embryo state, nor are they ever in a permanent vegetative state. Here the distinction seems to be rather based in the fact that all three persons share one and the same essence, but not their personhood, and that this essence might then be the one and only location for self-consciousness. The full actualization of personhood in the Trinity would then be rather different from what our knowledge of human personhood suggests.

I do not currently see any philosophical objections to this suggestion regarding the Trinity. But neither do I see what would force us to make this assumption. By contrast, Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, for example, would hold that there are three intelligent and free subjects in God.⁴ And [End Page 426] indeed, though the three persons are distinct from each other, each is not "really" distinct from the divine essence, and we would therefore expect each person to have all the properties that the essence has. The persons are distinct only by their proper relationality with each other. And this relationality consists in the way in which each person passes on the whole and entire essence to the other.⁵ Thus the Son has the whole essence as received from the Father; he has the essence in a filial way. He has the divine will in a filial manner, and the divine mind as "conceived" or in the form of a concept, word, or logos. If therefore self-consciousness is a property of the divine essence—for God is Spirit—and if persons are beings that have a nature or essence, then each of the divine persons has this one divine essence and the property of self." [https://muse.jhu.edu/article/735101]

Pray an Our Father now for the restoration of the Mass and the Church as well as for the Triumph of the Kingdom of the Sacred Heart of Jesus and the Immaculate Heart of Mary.